

HERODOTUS AND SAMOS

THE purpose of this paper is to re-examine Herodotus' Samian narrative and to attempt to analyse the nature of its sources.¹ In the light of this analysis I shall try to explain some of the peculiarities of the accounts of the reign of Polykrates, the career of Maiandrios and the part played by the Samians in the battles of Lade and Mykale. It will be argued that, in view of his sources, he could neither have over-emphasised the wealth and power of Polykrates nor transferred facts belonging to his predecessor to Polykrates himself, and that, consequently, we should adopt a longer chronology for Polykrates than some recent discussions have suggested² and follow Herodotus' chronological implications rather than Thucydides' synchronism in book i 13.6 of the reign of Polykrates with that of Cambyses of Persia (530–522 B.C.). Herodotus' narratives of Lade and Mykale become more comprehensible if they are examined in relation to his sources.

There can be no doubt that Herodotus' Samian material was obtained at first hand on a visit or visits to Samos which lasted for a considerable time. His knowledge of Samian proper names,³ references to the work of Samian artists⁴ and offerings in the Heraion,⁵ his disproportionately long account in Book iii of Samian internal politics⁶ and his generally favourable attitude to the Samians⁷ all point to this conclusion.

Who were his Samian informants? There is an *a priori* likelihood that they were aristocratic, like his own family. The short biography of Herodotus in the *Suda* (s.v.) tells us that he was the son of eminent parents and an enemy of Lygdamis, the local tyrant of Halikarnassos, from whom he fled to Samos. Later he returned to Halikarnassos and expelled

¹ I should like to thank Mr W. G. Forrest for his generous and helpful advice and criticism. The Samian passages are identified by Jacoby in his famous article on Herodotus in *RE* Supp. II (see esp. cols. 220–1).

² Mary White (*JHS* lxxiv (1954), 36–43, 'The Duration of the Samian Tyranny') accepts the Eusebian date for Polykrates' accession, c. 533, which is supported by Thucydides i 13.6. Her arguments are substantially accepted by Barron, *CQ* xiv (1964), 210–29, 'The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos'. H. Berve, *Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen* (Munich 1967), i 107–14; ii 582–8, gives a concise and comprehensive account of tyranny in Samos, with full references to the sources and to recent bibliography.

³ Herodotus knows but prefers to conceal the name of the Samian who embezzled treasure from Sataspes' eunuch (iv 43). The only Ionian trierarchs at Salamis named by Herodotus are the Samians Theomestor and Phylakos, later rewarded by Xerxes (viii 85.2). He also knows the names of the Samian envoys to Leotychidas (ix 90. See p. 90 below).

⁴ Herodotus mentions Theodoros, the maker of the bowl given by Kroisos to Delphi and of Polykrates' ring (i 51 and iii 41) and Rhoikos, the original architect of the Heraion (iii 60.4. See p. 83 below), also Mandrokles, who built Darius' bridge across the Bosphorus (iv 87).

⁵ He describes several offerings in the Heraion in terms which show he had seen them himself, in particular, the two wooden statues dedicated by Amasis 'which stood in the great temple behind the

doors right up to my own time' (ii 182. Cf. iv 87 and 152).

⁶ iii 39–49; 54–60; 120–5; 139–49. The Samian passages give the history of Samos from 525–c. 517 with an introductory chapter on Polykrates (iii 39). They are separated by passages describing the Persian history of exactly the same period. The parallel arrangement of material lends variety and does not necessarily suggest that Herodotus originally wrote two treatises. He exaggerated the importance of Samian internal history, which hardly counterbalances the Persian material. He justifies himself unconvincingly in 60.1 by referring to the three 'great works' of Samos. They are only mentioned in this one chapter.

⁷ E.g. iii 139.1 (*Σάμον βασιλεὺς Δαρεῖος αἰρέει, πολίων πασέων πρότην Ἑλληνίδων καὶ βαρβάρων*); iv 43.7; v 112.1. Cf. too ii 168.2, where Herodotus defines the length of the Egyptian cubit as equal to that of the Samian, and the odd account of the Samian desert colony 'Oasis' at iii 26, which can only come from a Samian source. His partiality for the Samians at Zankle is proved by the comment at vi 23.6: *οὐ μέντοι οἱ γε Σάμοι ἐποίησαν ταῦτα* (sc. kill the 300 Zankleans handed over to them by Hippocrates. See p. 88 below). Mr. Forrest drew my attention to this passage, with its significant *γε*: 'The Samians at any rate would not have done such a thing.' It may hint, too, that the Milesian refugees who accompanied them (vi 22.2) might have been capable of such a deed.

the tyrant, only to be exiled a second time. Another entry in the *Suda* (s.v. Πανύασις) adds that he was related to Panyassis, an epic poet put to death by Lygdamis. Although all the details of this tradition may not be trustworthy, there is no reason to doubt that Herodotus came from a rich family in Halikarnassos and his own work confirms that he spent some time in Samos. It is likely that his friends there were of similar rank and shared his attitude to tyranny. They were presumably opposed to the tyranny in Samos which collapsed in 479 after the battle of Mykale, when the island was liberated from Persia and the puppet-tyrant Theomestor deposed.⁸ The earlier medizing tyrants, Syloson and his son Aiakes, were the brother and nephew of Polykrates, and it is likely that the aristocratic friends of Herodotus in Samos had a hostile or distorted view of Polykrates as well as of his relatives.

We must not of course assume that Herodotus was a naive reporter who recorded uncritically all he was told. He tells us himself that he does not believe all the accounts he sets down in his history (vii 152.3). Nevertheless, the *kind* of information he acquired was limited by the sort of people he talked to. For Samos, as for Athens, where he acquired traditions from important families like the Philaids and Alcmaeonids, his information was to some extent dependent on who his friends were, and, since he recorded what he was told, the bias of the sources is sometimes detectable even if Herodotus himself did not necessarily share it.

For the Samians, as for most Greeks of Herodotus' generation and their fathers, the great experience had been the Persian wars. For Samos, this had meant liberation from Persia and attachment first to the Hellenic League against Persia (Herodotus ix 106.4), and, after 477 B.C., membership of the Delian League formed for the same purpose under the leadership of Athens. Medism, which had been the normal political alignment of Samos for more than a generation, apart from her wavering attachment to the Ionian revolt, now became tantamount to treachery. Samos became a loyal and active member of the Delian League. As a ship-contributing member she took part in its campaigns: inscriptions from the Heraion tell us that Samians fell fighting the Persians or their allies at the battle of Eurymedon⁹ and in Egypt¹⁰ and almost certainly fought with Athenians against the Peloponnesians at Aigina and at Tanagra during the first Peloponnesian war.¹¹

The most likely government to have succeeded the pro-Persian regime at Samos is an aristocracy. Aiakes, the son of Syloson, was reinstated immediately after the Ionian revolt but was dead by 480, when the Samian captain Theomestor was made tyrant by the Persians as a reward for his services at the battle of Salamis (viii 85.3), perhaps replacing a quasi-constitutional pro-Persian regime, established on the death of Aiakes and similar to the so-called 'democracies' established by Mardonios in Ionia after the revolt. The liberation of Samos in 479 was effected by a group of men led by the appropriately named Hegesistratos, who appealed to Leotychidas at Delos and persuaded him to bring the Greek fleet across to Ionia. These men were enemies of Theomestor and were known to Herodotus by name.¹² They were evidently a group of Samian aristocrats and it is reasonable to suppose that it was the same men who came to power in Samos after the battle of Mykale of which they were the occasion.

⁸ See below pp. 76 and 90.

⁹ A Hellenistic monument found in the Heraion commemorates the deeds of a Samian named Maiandrios at the battle of the Eurymedon (Hill² B 123).

¹⁰ Another monument in the Heraion records the part played by a Samian in the capture of fifteen Phoenician ships during the Egyptian expedition (Hill² B 113; Meiggs and Lewis, *GHI* no. 34).

¹¹ Samians were probably among the Ionians

who fought at Tanagra in 458. The Spartan dedication at Olympia was from spoils of Ionians as well as Athenians and Argives (Hill² B 112; Meiggs and Lewis, *GHI* no. 36; Pausanias v 10.4).

¹² ix 90.1. They were Lampon, son of Thrasylkes, Athenagoras, son of Arcestratidas and Hegesistratos, son of Aristagoras. That Herodotus gives their patronymics is perhaps an indication of family tradition. For Herodotus' exaggeration of the importance of this embassy see below p. 90.

Although probably under aristocratic government, Samos remained friendly and loyal to the Athenian democracy. Her attitude was not, apparently, altered by the radical reforms of Ephialtes in Athens in 462, since, as we have seen, the Samians recorded with pride their activities in the Egyptian campaign in the 450s.¹³ They may even have proposed the removal of the Delian treasury to Athens in 454/3.¹⁴ The Athenians would have had no cause to intervene in the internal affairs of Samos until after the revolt of 440–439, when they set up a democracy.¹⁵ We know from Thucydides (i 115.2) that an aristocracy was in power at the start of the revolt and there seems insufficient reason to doubt that the aristocrats had stayed in control throughout the period 479–440.¹⁶ They were opposed both to tyranny and to medism, which went hand in hand in Ionia during the period before the Peace of Kallias.¹⁷ Attitudes at Samos were probably similar.

In estimating the effect of Samian aristocratic sources on Herodotus' narrative due caution must be observed, since he reserved his own opinion and hunted for information in many quarters. It requires a close examination of passages known to come from Samian sources to elucidate their aristocratic origin and to analyse the complex attitude which they reflect to the related questions of tyranny and Persian domination at Samos. The account of Polykrates' medism and its consequences is particularly out of scale¹⁸ and Herodotus unconvincingly justifies its length (iii 60), giving as his excuse the three famous 'great works', the tunnel, the harbour-mole and the Samian Heraion, all of which occupy him for but one chapter. The excursus is occasioned by the help which Polykrates offered Kambyses in his attack on Egypt, which is narrated in iii 1–38. At iii 47 we are told of the Spartan expedition against Samos. This was undertaken in response to the appeal of Samian

¹³ See note 10 above.

¹⁴ Plut. *Aristeides* 25.3 quotes from Theophrastus the story that Aristeides (in reality dead many years before 454) opposed the Samian proposal, saying it was advantageous but unjust. In Plutarch, *Perikles* 12 the move (though not the proposal) is attributed to Pericles, but this chapter is rhetorical, contrasting Pericles' policy with that of the pan-hellenist and anti-imperialist Thucydides son of Melesias. Diodorus xii 38.2 says the Athenians moved the moneys and entrusted them to Pericles. It seems best to accept the Samian proposal, which would be a strange invention if it were untrue, and to reject the intrusion of Aristeides as an anachronistic anecdote about him on the model of the Aristeides-Themistokles contrast, another rhetorical *topos*.

Pritchett (*Historia* xviii (1969), 17–21) attempts to save the Aristeides anecdote by dating the removal of the treasury to the early years of the Delian League. But the numbering of annual Hellenotamiai in the Quota-list headings begins in 454/3. Since they administered the tribute and not merely the *aparache*, the institution of the *aparache* alone would not be an appropriate time for re-numbering their years of office, whereas the transfer of the Treasury would. Cf. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, p. 48.

¹⁵ The Athenian treaty with Samos, made after the revolt in 439/8, contains the reciprocal oath sworn to the Samian *demoi* by the Athenian generals of the year. See Meiggs and Lewis *GHI* no. 56. The restoration *δέμοι* in line 22 seems certain. During the Archidamian war the Samian exiles at Anaia were anti-Athenian oligarchs (Thuc. iii 39.2; iv 75.1).

¹⁶ Barron, *Silver Coins of Samos*, 80–9, argues that Samos was democratic from 494 (as a result of Mardonios' establishment of 'democracies' after the Ionian revolt) until an assumed oligarchic revolution in 453. This might account for a lettered series of fifteen issues of Samian silver coins, which on Barron's view were minted by the oligarchs during the fifteen years 453–439 and ended with the suppression of the Samian revolt and Athens' enforcement of the Coinage decree in Samos. But an oligarchic coup in 453, subsequent to the Samian proposal to move the Treasury, would have been an anti-Athenian move, unlikely to have been overlooked in the years during which Athens was reasserting her control over the Empire. The Athenians might have allowed a consistently loyal city to continue minting in spite of the Coinage decree but hardly a regime which had put down a pro-Athenian democracy. Alternatively, it might be possible to date the series to the fifteen years preceding the Coinage decree. Ronald P. Legon, 'Samos in the Delian League' (*Historia* xxi (1972), 145), opposes Barron's view with a careful review of the literary evidence for constitutional changes in Samos during the fifth century.

¹⁷ Cf. Erythrai, Meiggs and Lewis, *GHI* no. 40. Lines 27–9 and 33–7 of the decree (very fragmentary), contain sanctions against medism and tyranny. The Samian oligarchs were admittedly helped by Pissouthnes in 440 (Thuc. i 115.4–5), but the Athenians had by then taken the side of the democrats (*ibid.* 115.2–3).

¹⁸ See p. 75 n. 6 above.

aristocrats, who had been sent to aid Kambyses but instead disobeyed Polykrates' orders and had gone to Sparta to ask for help against the tyrant. Herodotus reveals the Samian and Spartan sources for the expedition of 524 in discussing the Spartans' motive: the Samians said the Spartans helped them out of gratitude for the naval help they had once given Sparta against the Messenians. The Spartans, however, adduced a more recent event, the theft by Samians of the bronze bowl they had sent to Kroisos before the fall of Sardis and of the linen corselet which Amasis of Egypt sent to Sparta as a token of the same anti-Persian alliance. Herodotus does not commit himself to either version but clearly believed that the thefts took place, since he refers to the ἀρπαγή of the bowl as a fact in the following chapter (iii 48.1), not merely in the Spartan account (iii 47.1). The incidents have already been referred to in the narrative of Kroisos' alliances (i 70), where the Samians deny the theft of the bowl, claiming that the Spartans in charge of it, unable to deliver it to Kroisos since Sardis had already fallen, sold it to some Samians (who later dedicated it in the Heraion, where Herodotus saw it), intending to explain on their return to Sparta that they had been robbed of it by the Samians. In i 70 Herodotus does not give an opinion on the Samians' guilt or innocence but in iii 47 he leaves open the question as to whether these thefts or the Messenian war aid were the motive for the Spartan expedition. But he does not doubt that the crater and corselet were in fact stolen by the Samians. The thefts provide the Spartans with a more credible motive, since they were committed when the Samians were probably already under a tyrannical regime in the time of Polykrates' father Aiakes. This would explain why the Spartans in 524 were willing to help one group of Samians against another.¹⁹ They also link Spartan foreign policy in 524 to her alliance with Kroisos before the fall of Sardis without implying that Sparta was on either occasion moved by a wider desire to ward off the threat of Persian aggression. If there had been such an underlying motive Herodotus' Spartan informants would surely have had an inkling of it. Common sense, then, would have led Herodotus to think that the Samians committed the thefts. Yet in both passages the Samians are given the benefit of the doubt. In i 70 there is a *suppressio veri*, since the thefts were in fact committed; in iii 47 Herodotus, by leaving the reader to judge for himself, suggests a doubt about their effect on the Spartans which he can hardly have shared. The passages, taken together, indicate partiality for the Samian good name.

To exonerate a Samian regime connected with Polykrates from blame would not necessarily indicate a Samian aristocratic source, for why should such a source have bothered to conceal the wicked deeds of a tyranny, any more than the Corinthians of Herodotus' day, who evidently condemned wholesale the atrocities of Periander? Yet the rest of his account of the 524 expedition suggests strongly that it was from aristocratic families that Herodotus got his information. In iii 45 he includes three different accounts about what happened to the Samians sent off in forty triremes to help Kambyses, presumably three conflicting family traditions.²⁰ There is no detail from the side of Polykrates. An aristocratic but patriotic Samian source would either condemn a tyranny as the Corinthians did (v 92), or, for patriotic reasons, might condone or conceal its more disreputable actions. The Samians, it will be argued, did the latter.

The Spartan version of the 524 expedition was given to Herodotus by an informant closely linked to the Samian aristocrats. Archias of the Spartan deme Pitana, whom Herodotus names (iii 55), was the grandson of another Archias, one of two Spartans killed

¹⁹ As Mary White has shown (*JHS* lxxiv (1954), 36-7), it must have been a tyrannical regime closely connected with Polykrates which committed the thefts. West (*CQ* xx (1970), 207) doubts the connection, but the arguments for it seem valid. Otherwise, the Spartans would have refused to help the Samian aristocrats against Polykrates.

²⁰ One account said they went no further than Karpathos, another that they actually reached Egypt before returning to Samos. Herodotus rejects a third story, that they there defeated Polykrates, on the ground that they would then have had no need to appeal to Sparta.

on the Samian expedition and given a public funeral by the Samians because of their bravery. His son, the father of Herodotus' informant, was named (or re-named) 'Samios' in commemoration. The Samians, not Polykrates, are credited with generosity, though the funeral could not have been held *δημοσίῃ* without the consent of Polykrates; which perhaps suggests that direct praise of the tyrant is deliberately avoided by Herodotus' source. The main point is, however, that Archias, was himself tied by the closest possible connections to the Samian aristocrats of only two generations earlier and *ξείνων πάντων μάλιστα ἐτίμα Σαμίους* (iii 55.2).

So far, we have identified Samian aristocratic sources and a Spartan source sympathetic to them. If Herodotus derived his information about the whole of Polykrates' career from the same Samian sources as his account of the Spartan expedition of 524, these too are likely to have been Samian aristocrats of the mid-fifth century to whom Polykrates would seem an equivocal character. In the early part of his reign he had made Samos the leading sea power in Greece. Yet it was probably his father Aiakes who had seized the gifts intended to cement Kroisos' alliance against Persia and, more serious, he himself had been a temporary and treacherous friend to Amasis of Egypt and deserted him for Kambyses in 525 when the Persian king was collecting an armament to invade Egypt (iii 39.2 and 44). We have seen that Samian tradition concealed the thefts. It is tempting to see its hand in the strangely unhistorical tragedy of Polykrates.

Herodotus can be accused of giving a naïve and fatalistic account of Polykrates. The story (iii 40–3) of how he tried to lose some of his wealth by throwing his ring into the sea and his excessive good fortune in recovering it from the fish's belly, Amasis' suspicion of this good luck and his letter to Polykrates breaking off the friendship are certainly inventions to cloak the fact that Polykrates medized. Herodotus presumably did not invent the story himself but was told it in Samos. That he shows no sign of disbelief is a further indication of his partiality for the Samians.

The story shows Polykrates in a better light than the real explanation, which was political expediency. It exonerates him from the charge of betraying a friend and suggests that his medism was prompted by Amasis, who broke off the alliance. It is much more likely that Polykrates took the initiative, knowing that Kambyses had the Phoenician fleet at his disposal and that his own island was no longer safe now Persia had become a sea-power. The Samian story stylises Polykrates' rise and fall into the standard Greek tragic formula of disaster following hard upon excessive good fortune, which excites the jealousy of the gods. *τὸ θεῶν ἔστι φθονερόν*. The Greek phrase sounds odd in the letter of the Egyptian Amasis (iii 40) which is blatantly spurious. The divine jealousy is later fulfilled when Polykrates is impaled by Oroites (iii 124–5), his body washed by the rain and anointed by the sun as his daughter's dream had prophesied.

All this is more like Greek tragedy than history and shows more fatalism than is characteristic of this part of Herodotus' history. He certainly believed in the general concept of destiny,²¹ but the account of Polykrates invites more serious criticism, since the alternative reason for Polykrates' desertion of Amasis was known to Herodotus but is not mentioned, as we might have expected, even as an alternative to which he does not commit himself.²² Instead, we are told the fish and ring story without any alternative. Herodotus' partiality for his Samian informants is the most likely explanation. The stylising and formalising of

²¹ Compare his treatment of Kroisos. i 91.1 (*τῆν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατά ἐστι ἀποφυγεῖν καὶ θεῶν*) may be disregarded, since it is part of the Delphic oracle's self-justification. But i 34.1 (*ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον, ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἑαυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὀλβιώτατον*) shows that Herodotus endorsed the fatalistic account of Kroisos.

²² Contrast v 62–63.1, where Herodotus gives one favourable and one unfavourable account of how the Alkmaionids won the support of Delphi in 511 but leaves the question open, though we know from v 71.2 and vi 121.1 that he was in general concerned to defend the Alkmaionids.

Polykrates' rise and fall was a suitably tragic theme. It conveniently camouflaged his swing to the Persian alliance and allowed Samians of the mid-fifth century to combine admiration for the thalassocracy and the public works of Polykrates' upward career with disapproval of the tyranny and medism which accompanied his success and helped to bring about his fall.

Two questions arise if we are right in attributing the tragedy of Polykrates to a Samian aristocratic source: first, when was the story invented? second, if Herodotus' account of Polykrates is inaccurate, in what way it is likely to have been distorted by his partiality for Samos and his Samian sources? For the invention of the story, the *terminus post quem* is the death of Polykrates, the fated reversal of his good fortune. How long after his death it became current can only be guessed, but it may well have been circulated by Polykrates' enemies soon after his death and passed down by oral tradition to their grandsons, from whom Herodotus could have heard it. It may have been suggested by the emphasis of the lyric poets Ibykos²³ and Anakreon²⁴ on the wealth, fame and fortune of Polykrates. On his death, his enemies, wise after the event, pointed the moral that good fortune can over-reach itself. Herodotus himself liked to look at human affairs in this light but the survival of the story in mid-fifth century Samos and in Herodotus' history is perhaps to be explained not only by its intrinsic appeal to Greeks as a tragic story but because it suited the Samians of Herodotus' generation to conceal the medism of Polykrates.

The second question raises difficulties for Herodotus' account of Polykrates as a whole. If he believed the fairy tale about Polykrates' ring, can we rely on anything in his account? Its value has recently been severely challenged by Barron on other grounds, mainly chronological and archaeological.²⁵ Herodotus' first-hand information about Samos, however, is not necessarily suspect because of his Samian bias. The story of why Polykrates medized is obviously false but that he deserted Amasis for Kambyzes is not disputed. Nor is there reason to doubt the thalassocracy of the earlier part of his reign. If, as Barron suggests,²⁶ he had been less successful than Herodotus suggests as a rival of the Persian-controlled mainland towns and had had his back to the wall in an attempt to stem Persian expansion, we might have expected Herodotus' sources to have paid attention to this aspect of his policy. But Herodotus emphatically says that Polykrates plundered all alike, without discrimination.²⁷ Mid-fifth century Samians, embarrassed by Polykrates' *volte-face* in 525—for his desertion of Amasis surely amounted to this—would hardly have invented the powerful sea-lord, the 'first thalassocrat since Minos of Crete' (iii 122.2) who won victories against Lesbos and Samos' old enemy Miletus, conquered many islands and even some places on the mainland (iii 39.4), in order to attribute these achievements to Polykrates. Rather, since they were his, they had to be accounted for by a *hubris-nemesis* view of his career. Similarly, they are unlikely to have invented his wealth and *μεγαλοπρεπείη*, com-

²³ Ibykos visited Samos in the time of Polykrates' father in the 54th Olympiad (564–60) in the time of Kroisos, according to the *Suda* (ii 607 Adler, with the necessary emendation of *ὁ Πολυκράτης τοῦ τυράννου πατήρ* to *ὁ τοῦ τυράννου Πολυκράτους πατήρ*. See West *CQ* xx (1970), 208). In *frg.* 282 Ibykos praises Polykrates alone and for his good looks, which suggests he was already tyrant and the poet's patron, but still relatively young. Ibykos' connection with Samos perhaps began with Aiakes and lasted into Polykrates' reign. The *Suda's* date seems a little early for Aiakes (conceivably calculated as a generation before the usual Hellenistic dating of Polykrates' accession, *c.* 532, or associated with Kroisos' accession, *c.* 560), but the connection of Ibykos' first visit with Aiakes may be real.

²⁴ See Page, *GMP*, Anakreon *frgs.* 138 and 146.

Anakreon was at Polykrates' court late in his reign (Hdt. iii 121). Strabo 638 says his poems were full of Polykrates and Himerios (*Or.* 28.2 p. 128 Colonna) tells us that he sang of the *τύχη* of Polykrates. Another passage of Himerios (*Or.* 29.22 p. 132 Colonna) suggests that he may have been appointed as Polykrates' tutor by Aiakes much earlier. West, *CQ* xx (1970), 207–8, makes acceptable sense of this confused account and summarises earlier views. It is quite likely that Polykrates continued his father's patronage of both Ibykos and Anakreon.

²⁵ *CQ* xiv (1964), 210–29, 'The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos'.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 215–17.

²⁷ *ἔφερε δὲ καὶ ἦγε πάντα διακρίνων οὐδένα* (iii 39.3).

parable to that of the Syracusan tyrants of the fifth century (iii 125.2). But if his prosperity was a fact, it had somehow to be made responsible for his fall.

If we accept the basic facts of Polykrates' reign from Herodotus, he must be credited with a longer reign than the period *c.* 532-522. If neither Herodotus nor his sources had a discoverable motive for exaggerating his achievements but, if anything, the reverse, we should avoid attributing a substantial part of these to his father Aiakes²⁸ (or, with Barron, to another Polykrates²⁹) if an acceptable solution to the chronological problems of his reign can be found. The narrative of Herodotus iii 39, taken alone, gives no absolute date for the beginning of his reign but implies that it began at any rate not long after 540. This allows the period of his independent naval supremacy to fall mainly before Kambyses' accession in 530 and acquisition for Persia of the Phoenician fleet, which restrained Polykrates' independent policy and forced him to desert Amasis in 525.³⁰ It is also likely that the fall of the Ionian coastal cities to Harpagus in the late 540s, after the fall of Sardis, led to a temporary eclipse of Samos' rival Miletus and so contributed indirectly to Samos' supremacy in the Aegean over the next few years, as Herodotus' mention of Polykrates' victories over Miletus and Lesbos indicates.

There is some slight support for Herodotus in the thalassocracy-list of Diodorus, preserved by Eusebius, which places the Samian sea-power after that of Phokaia, i.e. when the Phokaians emigrated to the west after the fall of Sardis, or, at latest, after the battle of Alalia a few years later, *c.* 538. The sixteen years' duration of the Samian thalassocracy has been shown conclusively to be without foundation, but the list probably goes back to fifth century origins.³¹ Thucydides, however, gives an absolute date for Polykrates' sea-power which synchronises it with the reign of Kambyses (530-522),³² and the consensus of later ancient chronology, probably based on Apollodoros, appears to follow Thucydides rather than Herodotus. Analysis of Thucydides' scanty references to Polykrates and Ionian sea-power in the *archaeologia* suggests that he was under a misconception, based on a schematic list of sea-powers of a kind fashionable in his generation, similar to though not identical with the Eusebian list. His chronology of Polykrates is paralleled by another equation of the same kind, perhaps based on the same list, which attributed the growth of Persian sea-power not to Kambyses but to Darius. He states that Darius was the first Persian king to conquer 'the islands' with the Phoenician navy.³³ Because he post-dated the use, if not strictly the acquisition of the Phoenician ships, to the reign of Darius, he had no reason for not extending Polykrates' sea-power to the end of Kambyses' reign, and so synchronised it roughly with the whole of that reign, which, as he knew from Herodotus, ended at about the time of Polykrates' death (iii 120.1). He therefore could have

²⁸ Cf. White, *op. cit.*, 36-9.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, 217-18. According to Barron, Polykrates' father, also called Polykrates, was the son of Aiakes, and Herodotus has conflated two tyrants of the same name. West (*CQ* xx (1970), 207-9) has shown that the evidence (all of it late) refers to only one Polykrates. See also Berve (*op. cit.* note 2).

³⁰ Phoenicia went over to Persia before the Egyptian expedition (Hdt. iii 19.3). Cyprus deserted Amasis for Kambyses at about the same time (Hdt. ii 182.2 and iii 19.3). Kyrene similarly abandoned her Egyptian alliance and made an approach to Persia (Hdt. ii 181 and iii 13.4).

³¹ See White, *op. cit.*, 39-40, for discussion of the Thalassocracy List, with bibliography. On the fifth-century origin of the list see J. L. Myres, *JHS*

xxvi (1906), 84-9 and Forrest, *CQ* xix (1969), 95-106.

³² Thuc. i 13.6: *καὶ Πολυκράτης Σάμον τυραννῶν ἐπὶ Καμβύσου ναυτικῶν ἰσχύων ἄλλας τε τῶν νήσων ὑπηκόους ἐποίησατο καὶ Ῥήγειαν ἐλὼν ἀνέθηκε τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Δηλίῳ.* Cf. book iii 104.2 for the same statement without the reference to Kambyses.

³³ Thucydides' list gave Ionian sea-power in the reigns of Cyrus and Kambyses. Two examples follow, Samian achievements under Polykrates in Kambyses' reign and the Phokaian foundation of Alalia (reading Ἀλαλίαν for Μασσαλίαν in i 13.6, a tempting emendation which gives an event in the same period although a few years earlier. Cf. Gomme *ad loc.*). Darius' sea-power perhaps came next on the list, if i 13.6 and 16 are derived from the same source, as is likely.

missed an essential factor in Polykrates' career, namely, that it was the acquisition of Phoenician ships by *Kambyses* which forced him into alliance or agreement with Persia.

Thucydides undoubtedly had less information about sixth century Samos than Herodotus, and the absolute dating he gives for the reign probably rests on nothing more than the sea-power list. Such independent knowledge as he had about Polykrates was probably derived from his researches into the history of the Delian festival. He knew of Polykrates' attachment of Rheneia to Delos (i 13.6 and iii 104.2). This was chronologically connected with a festival he founded at Delos late in his reign, since the rebuff delivered to him by the Delphic oracle on this occasion, *ταῦτά σοι καὶ Πύθια καὶ Δήλια*, which became proverbial, meaning 'it's all the same to you', were supposed to have been fulfilled by his death shortly afterwards.³⁴

It would be natural for Polykrates to concentrate on winning or maintaining prestige in the west Aegean late in his reign when the newly acquired Persian naval strength would prevent him from molesting the Ionian cities and islands of the east Aegean. Thucydides indeed mentions Polykrates' conquest of 'other islands', but singles out Rheneia and is concerned in this episode with the latter part of Polykrates' career, which he knew coincided with Kambyses' reign. But the conquest of 'many of the islands and cities of the mainland' in Herodotus' account (iii 39.4) belongs to the earlier phase when he was active in the whole Aegean. 'The islands' were probably captured by Polykrates in the reign of Cyrus, not Kambyses, but Thucydides associated them with the intervention at Delos and capture of Rheneia, which he was well informed about, and telescoped the whole of Polykrates' naval activity, wrongly, into the latter part of his reign. As noticed above, he postpones the Persian dominion of 'the islands' to Darius' sea-power.

Thucydides, then, in my view, because of his notions about sea-power and his specific knowledge of the history of Delos, was led to synchronise the reign of Polykrates with that of Kambyses. It may not be coincidental, but the result of the influence of the absolute dating in Thucydides, that the accepted dating for the tyranny of Polykrates in the Apollodoros tradition, followed by Eusebius, placed his accession in the 62nd Olympiad (532-528), which also contains the accession of Kambyses. For Apollodoros, the 62nd Olympiad was the accepted date for Polykrates' accession and for the *floruit* of the philosopher Pythagoras, who fled from his rule to the west.³⁵ Both Thucydides and the Hellenistic chronologers probably had a reliable accession date for Kambyses and the translation to the absolute Olympiad dating would be the result of Thucydides' mistaken synchronism and not derived from any reliable independent source. It is preferable, because of the direct oral tradition of his sources, to follow Herodotus' implication of an earlier accession date, *c.* 540 or not long after, even though his account does not reveal an absolute year.

An early accession-date makes it possible to associate Polykrates with the three 'great works' of Samos mentioned by Herodotus, the tunnel, built by Eupalinos of Megara, the harbour-mole and the Heraion (iii 60). Although anonymous in Herodotus, they are mentioned at the end of the Polykrates narrative and are reasonably identified with the *ἔργα Πολυκράτεια*, the 'works of Polykrates' mentioned by Aristotle in the *Politics* (1313b). It has been doubted whether they can be all attributed to Polykrates because of the time they must have taken to construct.³⁶ Except for the Heraion, where real difficulties are raised by the archaeological evidence, this is a problem only if the later date for Polykrates' accession is accepted. The harbour-mole and tunnel could both have been completed in

³⁴ Parke, *The Delphic Oracle*, ii no. 67 and 'Polykrates and Delos', *CQ* xl (1946), 105-8. It is not necessary, however, to believe that the Delian episode represents the major part of Polykrates' naval activity.

³⁵ Jacoby, *Apollodors Chronik*, frgs. 17 and 24. See

also J. S. Morrison, *CQ*, N.S. vi (1956), 135-56 and Von Fritz, *RE* xxiv (1963), cols. 179-87. Barron's extended chronology (*CQ* xiv (1964), 226-8) is less convincing.

³⁶ White, *op. cit.*, 40-1. Barron, *op. cit.*, 214.

Polykrates' reign if he seized power in the early 530s.³⁷ The tunnel, which served both as an aqueduct and an escape-route, leads through the mountain behind Samos to a water-supply. It was evidently cut from both ends simultaneously, since the two tunnels do not meet in the same plane.³⁸ But the rock is hard limestone, and considering the limitations of ancient tools and the small number of men who can have worked at the rock face at one time, it has been reasonably calculated that only about six inches a day could have been excavated at each face. Since the tunnel is over 3,400 feet in length, and was excavated at the rate of about one foot per day, it will have taken about ten years to complete.³⁹ Above ground, there are a reservoir, surface-channels, and a spring-house inside the city. These works may have taken five years to build, but it is not necessary to add a further five years to allow for their construction, since the surface work could have been carried on at the same time as the excavation of the tunnel. Polykrates had plenty of labour (he used Lesbian captives to dig the ditch round the encircling wall of Samos⁴⁰) and, since the tunnel was strategically necessary both as water-supply and escape-route, it is likely that the work was carried out with expedition. Both the tunnel and the harbour-mole were important for defence and are therefore likely to have been begun in the earlier years of Polykrates' reign. The tunnel seems to have been completed before 524, since the Samians managed to hold out for forty days against the Spartans (Hdt. iii 56.1), and must have therefore been begun at least by 535. On the Herodotean chronology, Polykrates would by then have overthrown his brothers and made his rule secure. It is not necessary to attribute the beginning of the tunnel and harbour-works to his predecessor.

The dating of the Heraion is a separate problem. The excavations of Buschor before and after the last war have shown that it was begun in the generation before Polykrates, about 570.⁴¹ Rhoikos, whom Herodotus calls its 'first architect' (iii 60.4), worked later on the Artemision at Ephesos, perhaps about 560, since many of its columns were given by Kroisos.⁴² The archaeological evidence shows that the Heraion was destroyed by fire and begun again on foundations a little to the west to allow for the building of an altar at the east end, with a similar but somewhat bigger ground-plan. It is this second temple which Herodotus saw, and which is to be associated with Polykrates. After his death it was abandoned but was continued in the fifth century, then abandoned again until Hellenistic times and never completed. The earlier temple, on which Rhoikos is known to have collaborated with another famous Samian artist, Theodoros, was famous for its novel dipteral style (which influenced the design of the Ephesian Artemision) and the book written about it by Theodoros.⁴³ It is possible that Rhoikos, who lived into the reign of Polykrates, supervised the re-building of the temple on its altered site, and that Herodotus distinguishes him from other later architects who may have been responsible for the renewed building in the fifth century. Alternatively, Herodotus' informants may have mentioned Rhoikos to underline the fact that the temple was first built in aristocratic times before the tyranny and its design essentially copied by Polykrates' builders. On either view, Rhoikos

³⁷ Fabricius, *Ath. Mitt.* ix (1884), 163-92. For a recent description and photographs see June Goodfield, *The Scientific American*, June 1964, 104.

³⁸ See photograph in Goodfield, *op. cit.*

³⁹ Bichowsky, *Compressed Air Magazine* xlvii (1943), 7086-90, gives a useful physical description of the tunnel but a fanciful account of Eupalinos, linking him with Theagenes of Megara, Thales, and Pythagoras!

⁴⁰ Hdt. iii 39.4. Aristotle agrees that Polykrates had an abundance of labour but attributes his public works policy to the need to keep the population busy so as to prevent rebellion (*Politics* 1313b 21-5), a biased view.

⁴¹ On the relation between the Rhoikos temple

and Polykrates' temple, its successor, see Reuther, *Der Heratempel von Samos*, 63-5 and Gruben in Berve, Gruben and Hirmer, *Greek Temples, Theatres and Shrines*, 453-4. Pausanias' statement (vii 5-4) that the earlier temple was burnt by the Persians should be rejected, since Herodotus would not have omitted a fact so relevant to his main theme.

⁴² Tod, *GHI* no. 6; Hdt. i 92.

⁴³ Diog. Laert. ii 103; Pliny *NH* 36.95; Paus. x 38.6. On the dates and relationship of Rhoikos and Theodoros see White, *op. cit.* 41-2; Barron, *op. cit.* 213, note 2. For Herodotus' knowledge of the two artists see notes 4 and 5 above.

must have been the architect of the earlier building, since this was the first dipteral temple, and must have been the subject of Theodoros' book. It is less likely that Herodotus was simply mistaken or misinformed about the name of Polykrates' architect, since he clearly knew a great deal about the Heraion and its contents and about the work of Rhoikos and Theodoros; he is therefore unlikely to have associated Rhoikos with the wrong building. He either means that Rhoikos was responsible for the earlier temple, which was in essentials the model for the second, or that Rhoikos was architect of both temples.

The building of the Heraion was delayed and it would in any case have taken years to complete. The military demands of the time required that priority should be given to the tunnel, harbour-mole and the new encircling city wall, all necessary for the defence of Samos and its sea-power. The anonymity of the three major works could be due to deliberate omission by Herodotus, who prefers to leave us with the impression that they were achievements of the Samians as a whole rather than of Polykrates. This would be consistent with the attitude of an aristocratic source which preferred not to over-emphasise his greatness. However that may be, there need be no doubt that Polykrates was the author of the tunnel, the harbour-mole and of the temple which Herodotus saw, still incomplete.

It has been argued⁴⁴ that the wealth and artistic achievements of Samos under Polykrates have been exaggerated by Herodotus. This is unlikely, considering the nature of his sources. Admittedly, Polykrates' priority must have been naval supremacy and the defence of Samos. But there are many details indicating his wealth and luxury which Herodotus could not have invented: the patronage of Anakreon (Hdt. iii 121.1), Ibykos⁴⁵ and Demokedes, the doctor from Kroton, who deserted the Peisistratids, rich as they were, for Polykrates, who paid him two talents a year instead of 100 minas (Hdt. iii 131). His wealth was the fruit of indiscriminate piracy (Hdt. iii 39.3), and he was able to finance public works and the arts. Later sources exaggerated the luxury of Samian life and customs. Ionian *τροφή* became a well-worn theme and Samos was an obvious example.⁴⁶ But Herodotus' indications of Polykrates' wealth and patronage of the arts cannot be inventions.

Archaeological evidence has suggested to some that the greatest artistic achievements of Samos belong to the first two thirds of the sixth century and that a decline began in the last third, that is, in the reign of Polykrates, if the later date for his accession is accepted.⁴⁷ The evidence is drawn mainly from surviving sixth century Samian sculpture. Whereas there are many fine *kouroi* of heroic proportions belonging to the earlier part of the century, they become scarce towards the end. It has been suggested that enforced austerity in the reign of Polykrates, owing to the military demands of keeping the Persians at a distance, is responsible. But the discovery of fewer *kouroi* from Polykrates' period and after may be the result of other factors. Discounting the chances of discovery and identification, it would seem that the greatest artists of the period, Rhoikos and Theodoros, were more interested in working in bronze than in stone. Bronze-casting is both more expensive and technically more demanding than working in stone and at the same time has less chance of survival.⁴⁸ In addition there is likely to be a political reason for the decline of large *kouroi*, since they were the characteristic dedications of aristocratic families. Since in Samos the aristocrats were Polykrates' enemies, they may have been forbidden to make ostentatious dedications in the form of large votive statues representing themselves. In Naxos, where there is a parallel decline, they were embassassing to the tyrant Lygdamis. Aristotle (*Economics* 1346b), tells us that Lygdamis, a contemporary (and incidentally a friend of Polykrates⁴⁹), having

⁴⁴ Barron, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ See notes 23 and 24.

⁴⁶ E.g. Douris (c. 300 B.C.), *ap. Athen.* xii 525 E-F. Jacoby *FGH* 76 F60, comments 'die Ionische *τροφή* ist ein historischer τόπος'.

⁴⁷ Barron, *op. cit.*, 215.

⁴⁸ Richter, *Kouroi*², 114, notes the decline of large *kouroi* in Naxos and Samos during this period and suggests that one factor responsible was the sculptors' transference of interest from stone to bronze.

⁴⁹ Polyainos, *Strategemata* i 23.2.

driven some Naxian aristocrats into exile, found half-finished statues in the sculptors' workshops which the aristocrats had commissioned and sold them either to the exiles themselves or to anyone else who wished to buy them, allowing the name of the purchaser to be inscribed on them. They could evidently not be used for their intended purpose. We do not know what Polykrates' attitude to such dedications was, but it would not be surprising if a peculiarly aristocratic form of offering declined during his reign. We cannot deduce from this that the prosperity of Samos as a whole and of the court was thereby lessened. The ruins of his palace were still impressive in the time of Caligula (Suet. *Caligula* 21). We cannot conclude that Polykrates was not prosperous, still less, that he was politically unsuccessful, because one particular art-form declined during his reign.

The death of Polykrates was, according to Herodotus (iii 125.4), the fulfilment of his daughter's dream and his destiny. It was the tyrant's own greed which enabled the satrap Oroites to entice him to Magnesia and to have him impaled. By underlining the hand of fate in these events Herodotus, or his Samian sources, have obscured the political facts of the situation, though they are hinted at in the narrative. After his desertion of Amasis in 525, Polykrates was in virtually the same position as the tyrants of the Ionian coastal cities, a vassal of Persia. The ambitious Oroites was trying to carve out a western empire for himself in the confused period of the rebellion of the Magus and the troubles of Darius' accession, and presumably hoped to add Polykrates' power to his own (Hdt. iii 122.2). He later murdered Mitrobates, the loyal satrap of the northern coastal province of Daskyleion, and his son Kranaspes (Hdt. iii 126.2). One of Herodotus' sources suggested that Oroites and Polykrates had previously quarrelled and this version is followed by Diodorus. The better attested version, according to Herodotus, was that Oroites was prompted to kill Polykrates by the taunting of Mitrobates (iii 120). In either case, Polykrates' death was due to the enmity of a jealous satrap and has to be seen in the context of Darius' early difficulties in establishing control over a rebellious satrap in a distant province when he had serious revolts in the eastern parts of the empire to put down.⁵⁰ When his throne was secure he had Oroites put to death for the murder of Mitrobates and his other crimes, which included the killing of Polykrates. Such was the pattern of vengeance, the *τίσις*, narrated by Herodotus in iii 126-8.

The tragic pattern suggests that Polykrates was killed because of his own fatal flaw, his greed for wealth, and obscures the fact that at the end of his reign, Polykrates was an ally of Persia, on the same side as the loyal satrap Mitrobates, and that they were both killed by Oroites for similar reasons. In his narrative of Polykrates' death, as in his account of his medism, Herodotus made use of tragic fatalism. Just as the Greek tragedians saw events bifocally, determined by fate and the gods but at the same time caused by free, or apparently free, human decisions, similarly Herodotus and his informants were familiar with the same dichotomy and the tragic device is artistically effective in Herodotus' portrayal of Kroisos and Xerxes as well as Polykrates. But in the case of the Samians there was a strong political motive for such a treatment and his partiality for them may have influenced Herodotus in his choice of it for Polykrates, to the detriment of his reputation as a historian.

The aristocratic bias of Herodotus' Samian narrative is easier to detect in his account of Maiandrios, Polykrates' secretary and heir to his power (iii 139-49).⁵¹ He was an ambitious man, and perhaps came from a family with dynastic aspirations, since his two brothers were associated with his rule. His rule was not popular in Samos. He depended on a bodyguard of *ἐπίκουροι*, whom he handed over to his brother Charilaos before escaping through a tunnel to avoid the Persian invasion, so that resistance offered by Charilaos and the body-

⁵⁰ Darius' Behistun inscription (Kent, *Old Persian*, DB i), records the suppression of revolts put down during Darius' first year (522-1). See Burn, *Persia and the Greeks*, c. 6. For the chronology cf. Hallock,

Journal of Near Eastern Studies, xix (1960), 36-9.

⁵¹ The peculiarities in Herodotus' account of Maiandrios were noticed by Erma Eloise Cole in *The Samos of Herodotus* (Yale, 1912).

guard should provoke the Persians and enable him to escape in the confusion (iii 145–6). Maiandrios' departure was cowardly, yet Herodotus credits him with high motives after Polykrates' death. We are told that he 'wished to be the justest of men but was unable to realise his aims', that he tried to avoid becoming tyrant, that he founded a cult of Zeus Eleutherios and gave up the wealth left him by Polykrates in return for six talents and a hereditary priesthood for his family in the new cult (iii 142). He proclaimed: *Πολυκράτης μὲν νυν ἐξέπλησε μοῖραν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐς μέσον τὴν ἀρχὴν τιθεὶς ἰσονομίην ὑμῖν προαγορεύω* (iii 142.3). The Samians, however, distrusted his motives, and, for fear of tyranny from some other quarter, Maiandrios stayed in power. On a pretext of allowing his enemies to examine the account of his moneys, he imprisoned them, but when he became ill, his brother Lykaretos, hoping to succeed his brother, put them to death. Herodotus comments: 'It seems the Samians did not wish to become a free people' (iii 143.2).

It is not surprising that no one except the soldiers of Maiandrios lifted a finger against the Persians when Otanes intervened to put Syloson in power. As a relative of Polykrates he was probably an acceptable choice to the Samian demos, and the Persians wanted a ruler they could trust. The chaos of Maiandrios' rule had apparently lasted for several years, since the Persian intervention took place after Demokedes' long voyage to the west on reconnaissance for Darius of the Greek coastlands, before which he had already spent some time as court physician at Sousa, where he had been taken after the death of Polykrates (Herodotus iii 125.1 and 129.3 to 139.1). Allowing, say, four years for the doings of Demokedes in Darius' service (522 to 518) the Persian intervention in Samos will fall in 518 or 517. Herodotus' aristocratic source must have been favourable to Maiandrios or we cannot explain the attribution of high motives to him. The proclamation of *ἰσονομίη* was an aristocratic rather than a democratic move, comparable to the reforms of Demonax of Mantinea at Kyrene a few years earlier, also described in democratic terms by Herodotus (iv 161.3). That one of Maiandrios' enemies taunted him with low birth (Hdt. iii 142.5) is no obstacle to believing him to have been an aristocrat, since this accusation could be hurled at a political enemy in any Greek context.⁵² What seems to be decisive is the fact that after his flight from Samos he appealed to Sparta, the old friend and ally of the Samian aristocrats (Hdt. iii 148), hoping to persuade the Spartans to attack Samos as they had done in 524. The *ἐλευθερία* Maiandrios hoped to establish in Samos was freedom from tyranny and from Persia but the *ἰσονομίη* he proclaimed was consistent with aristocratic control. He was a self-interested and ambitious noble who had worked his way into Polykrates' favour while the tyrant was alive but tried to put an aristocratic faction back in power after his death. Herodotus' account of him is more favourable than the facts allow, and this must be due to a favourable source, perhaps Maiandrios' descendants.

The Samian anti-Persian source is again recognisable in the story of the netting and depopulation of Samos by the Persians after the restoration of Syloson. Soon afterwards, Herodotus says, they repopulated the island. The story must be regarded as an invention, to make sufferings of the Samians at the hands of the Persians appear greater than they really were. The absence of all resistance from the Samian demos shows that they welcomed the return of Polykrates' brother and the expulsion of Maiandrios, and Herodotus tells us that Darius' instructions to Otanes were not to harm or enslave the Samians. The netting and killing of all the inhabitants would have been unnecessary once the resistance of the body-guard of Maiandrios and Charilaos had been overcome. That Samos was not depopulated is shown by the appearance of Syloson's son and successor Aiakes with a fleet in support of Darius at the Danube only four years later.⁵³ The Persian intervention in Samos only became necessary after Polykrates' death because the stasis occasioned by Maiandrios

⁵² E.g. Alkaios calls Pittakos *τὸν κακοπατρίδαν* (Page *GMP* no. 348. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, 169–71).

⁵³ Hdt. iv 138. Cf. How and Wells on Hdt. iii 149.

made the island unreliable, in contrast to its friendliness towards Persia in the last years of Polykrates. We do not need to believe that Darius put Syloson in power solely out of gratitude for his cloak.⁵⁴ He was probably the obvious candidate because he was Polykrates' brother. Later, Herodotus' informants exaggerated the nature of the Persian intervention and the sufferings of Samos at the time.

The rule of Syloson was said to be harsh and some of the aristocrats may have emigrated and lost their lands. A proverb quoted by Aristotle says that he 'made plenty of room',⁵⁵ presumably at their expense. Some were probably tempted by the offer of land in Libya, as colonists of Arkesilas III of Kyrene.⁵⁶ Emigration, in fact, was a solution to political difficulties which Samian aristocrats had used earlier, when some had fled from Polykrates to found the city they named Dikaiarchia⁵⁷ (later Puteoli) between Naples and Cumae, and were to find useful again, when enemies of Aiakes, who returned with the Persians in 494, fled to Zankle to avoid his rule.⁵⁸ The Samian citizen-body must have been somewhat depleted by these emigrations and another fragment of Aristotle's *Constitution of the Samians* notes a measure enfranchising slaves when citizen-numbers had declined under the oppression of the tyrants.⁵⁹ This tradition, if true, would suggest that there was a real shortage of citizens for a while, which Herodotus' source claimed was due to Otanes' massacre, but which may have been the result of successive emigrations.

On reaching events nearer his own time, it is possible to detect in Herodotus' narrative an *apologia* for the part played by Samos in the Ionian revolt. The cowardly behaviour of the Samians in the sea-battle off Lade where the Ionians were defeated in 494 was necessarily difficult for the Samians of Herodotus' generation to explain. Some of the narrative of vi 13-14 must come from a Samian source, since the treacherous bargain made by the Samians with Aiakes to desert is excused, the blame being laid on the overwhelming might of the King's armies and the refusal of the Ionian crews to train, which made resistance hopeless and gave the Samians some sort of justification (*πρόφασις*) for deserting (vi 13 1-2). Herodotus had non-Samian sources as well, for he goes on to say that it was impossible to record which of the Ionians were brave and which were cowardly in the battle, since the participants accused one another (vi 14.1). The Samians 'were said' (presumably by Milesian, Chian or Lesbian informants) to have broken their ranks just before the battle, in accordance with their bargain with Aiakes,⁶⁰ who had evidently promised to spare Samian property and temples, a promise kept when he was restored to Samos after the battle (vi 25). The Samian desertion caused the Lesbians, stationed next to them, to follow them, and the majority of the Ionian fleet did the same (vi 14.3). So the Samians were to blame for losing the battle even before it began. Yet Herodotus does not openly condemn their desertion or question their motives, though he mentions the stele set up by the Samian *κοινόν* in the agora at Samos, where he had certainly seen it, inscribed with the names of the eleven trierarchs who had disobeyed their generals' orders and refused to desert.

⁵⁴ Hdt. iii 139-40. An unlikely story. See Burn, *op. cit.*, p. 130. It was a fiction invented to connect Syloson with Darius before Darius' conspiracy won him the throne. But Syloson would be the natural candidate for any Persian king to select as ruler of Samos.

⁵⁵ Rose, *frg.* 574 (from Strabo 638). The proverb was quoted in this context in the Aristotelian *Constitution of Samos*.

⁵⁶ Some Samian aristocrats may have emigrated to Kyrene at this time in response to the appeal of Arkesilas III for volunteers *ἐπι γῆς ἀναδασμῶ*. (Hdt. iv 163.1.) Cf. *JHS* lxxxvi (1966), 99.

⁵⁷ Eusebius (Jerome) under the year 524 (*variae*

lectiones give 528 and 521): Samii Dicaearchian condiderunt quam nunc Puteolos vocant. See Barron, *op. cit.* p. 228 note 2.

⁵⁸ Hdt. vi 22-3. See below p. 88.

⁵⁹ Rose, *frg.* 575. This presumably comes from the same source as the preceding fragment. Both exaggerate the harshness of Syloson's rule, which primarily affected the aristocrats, and are likely to come from an aristocratic source.

⁶⁰ Hdt. vi 14.2: *λέγονται δὲ Σάμιοι ἐνθαῦτα κατὰ τὰ συγκείμενα πρὸς τὸν Αἰάκεια ἀειράμενοι τὰ ἰστία ἀσπλώσαι ἐκ τῆς τάξιος ἐς τὴν Σάμον, πλὴν ἑνδεκα νεῶν.*

How long afterwards the stele was set up Herodotus does not say, but it cannot have been before Samos was liberated from Persia after the battle of Mykale in 479.⁶¹ The accusations of treachery at Lade must have been directed at Samos by other Ionian cities and Herodotus' account of the battle shows sure signs of the Samians' self-justification against such recriminations. Both the excuses for the bargain with Aiakes and the erecting of the stele were part of the Samians' later attempt to do their best with the sorry record of the battle. We do not need to suppose that Herodotus was following two opposed Samian sources, one apologising for the deserters and the other representing the loyal trierarchs and the aristocrats who emigrated to Sicily before Aiakes' return (vi 22).⁶² Later, after Mykale, patriotic Samians may well have said 'many deserted, but not without justification, and there were some captains, whom we have now honoured, who stayed to fight'. It is of course possible that a loyalist account could have reached Herodotus, from one of the Samian émigré aristocrats while Herodotus himself was at Thurii or in Sicily. But Herodotus' excursus on the fate of the colonists (vi 22–24) reads more like an appendix to the account of the battle itself and contains considerable western detail. It very likely reached Herodotus from a western source, perhaps a Samian emigrant who stayed in the west after the colony folded up a few years later (as Thucydides tells us, but Herodotus significantly does not reveal).⁶³ The main account of Lade, however, reflecting as it does the accusations and counter-accusations of the participants, probably comes from Eastern rather than Western Samian sources, and the story of the loyal trierarchs at any rate was certainly given to Herodotus in Samos where he saw the stele. He would have heard it long before he went to Thurii as a colonist in 443 and made further investigations about the colonists of Zankle while he was in the West himself.

By their treachery at Lade the Samians had betrayed their fellow Ionians as well as compromising themselves with Aiakes and the Persians. But in 494, the aristocrats who had been the keenest supporters of the revolt, had withdrawn to Zankle. Those who remained, the majority, settled down under Aiakes again, though he does not seem to have been replaced by another tyrant at his death, since there was no Samian tyrant at the time of Salamis (Hdt. vii 85.3). The tribute settlement made for Ionia by Artaphernes was fairly assessed and not punitive (Hdt. vi 42.2). Hardly any of Xerxes' Ionian allies deserted him at Salamis and the Samians particularly fought well on the Persian side, since their trierarchs Theomestor and Phylakos received rewards (viii 85.3). In the period between 494 and the defeat of Xerxes at Salamis, the majority of Samians who had remained must have felt that the Ionian revolt had been a mistake. Firstly, it had been organised by Samos' old enemy Miletos and led by her tyrant Aristagoras, and secondly, it had failed. We know from Herodotus' account of Lade that he had more than one source for it, so he clearly had several sources for the revolt as a whole. He must have had information from Miletos and other Ionian cities as well as Samos. But his condemnation of the revolt as ill-conceived and begun by Aristagoras for selfish motives because of his quarrel with the Persian commander Megabates, is consistent with his Samian sympathies and explains some of the peculiarities of his narrative of the revolt as a whole.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Cf. Macan's note on vi 14.3.

⁶² Cf. Grundy, *The Great Persian War*, 124 ff.

⁶³ Herodotus shows his partiality for these Samians by leaving them in free possession of Zankle: *Σάμιοι δὲ ἀπαλλαγθέντες Μήδων ἀπονητὶ πόλιν καλλίστην Ζάγκλην περιεβεβλέατο* (vi. 24.2). Cf. too vi 23.6 and note 7 above. He does not follow the digression to the end to tell us that the colony lasted only a few years, as Thucydides reveals (Thuc. vi 4.5). For the coinage of the Samians at Zankle see Robinson, *JHS* lxvi (1946), 13–20 and Barron, *The Silver Coins*

of Samos, 40–5.

⁶⁴ A pessimistic view of the revolt would be consistent with isolationists known to Herodotus in Athens. For example, it was probably an Alkmaionid who described the twenty Athenian ships sent to help the Ionians as *ἀρχὴ κακῶν* for both Greeks and barbarians (Hdt. v 97.3). Cf. Cawkwell, *Blacklock Essays*, 'Themistocles', p. 55 note 12. But the account of Lade comes from Ionian sources and the colouring of the account of the revolt as a whole is surely due to the same sources.

A Samian account of the revolt would be included to over-emphasise the inefficiency of the planning of it by their rivals the Milesians and the disunity of the Ionians in general. It would explain why Herodotus does not, as might have been expected, present the revolt as the first attempt to liberate the Ionians from Persian rule and, as such, a noble failure. The alternative explanation, that Herodotus despised the Ionians because he was himself a Dorian from Halikarnassos, is not supported by his attitude to Ionians as racially distinct from Dorians. His friends the Samians were Ionian, and he wrote in the common Ionic dialect of the coastal cities and islands.⁶⁵

A Samian thread in the narrative of the beginning of the Ionian revolt would account for the hostile account of Aristagoras. The Milesian tyrant may not have been courageous (he fled to Myrkinos at the first serious reversal),⁶⁶ but, as most commentators have argued, the quarrel between Aristagoras and Megabates over the Persian's punishment of Skylax would be insufficient to explain the raising of the revolt without previous planning by the Ionian cities. The chance arrival of the slave with the tattooed head, sent by Histiaios from Sousa to raise the revolt, does not help to explain matters, since it also implies pre-arrangement. It very likely reflects a Milesian account of why the revolt started, since it is more favourable to Miletus than the Aristagoras version. The two accounts are not reconcilable, for it is hardly conceivable that the message from Histiaios should have arrived just when Aristagoras had left himself no other course but revolt by forewarning the Naxians of the coming attack. Herodotus' abrupt introduction of the slave, *τὸν ἐστιγμένον* (v. 35.2), suggests the influence of a Milesian version which was well known to his informants. The Aristagoras story may be the Samian account of the beginning of the revolt, which was critical of Miletos, and the tattooed slave a Milesian attempt to rescue the reputation of Histiaios (whose career was ambiguous⁶⁷) by making him responsible for the revolt. In Herodotus' account, the slave is subsidiary, since his arrival just 'happens' to coincide with the beginning of the revolt.⁶⁸ This perhaps reflects a Samian correction of a well-known Milesian story rather than an abrupt charge by Herodotus from a Samian to a Milesian source.

With conflicting Ionian and Samian information, Herodotus may well not have been able to discover the truth about the beginning of the Ionian revolt. Certainly a predominantly Samian outlook seems to account for the inconsistency between his unfavourable judgement of the motives for the revolt and the overall view of his history, namely, that life under the Persians was slavery and that freedom was worth fighting for. We are brought back to his real opinion by his final comment on the suppression of the revolt: 'In this way Ionia was enslaved for the third time' (vi 32). In the years after 479, when, as we have seen, the Samians were loyal members of the Delian League, they claimed that the revolt was badly organised and badly led by Aristagoras of Miletos but that nevertheless they had not disgraced themselves (note too the comment (v 112) that they distinguished themselves more than the rest of the Ionians against the Phoenicians in Cyprus). They would have

⁶⁵ He makes no distinction between them in his account of the revolt, and the Ionic *κωή* was the natural language of Halikarnassos in the mid-fifth century (shown by a local inscription, Meiggs and Lewis *GHI* no. 32). Herodotus' strange comment on Kleisthenes' reform of the four Ionian tribes in Athens: *δοκέειν ἔμοι καὶ οὗτος ὑπεριδὼν Ἴωνας* (v 69.1), whatever it means, does not imply that Herodotus shared the prejudice he attributes to Kleisthenes.

⁶⁶ Hdt. v 124. But it is possible that Herodotus' comment on him (*ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄκρος*) is over-harsh and again due to Samian bias. He may have hoped to

turn Myrkinos into a base, as Megabazus had earlier suspected Histiaios of doing (Hdt. v 23).

⁶⁷ Blamire (*CQ* ix (1959), 142) argues that he was loyal to Darius throughout, but he was evidently deceptive at v 106–7. Probably he saw the outbreak of the revolt as an opportunity to secure his return to Miletos but was thwarted by Artaphernes at Sardis (vi 1). His position was not unlike that of Alkibiades in Sparta in 412, when the outbreak of the Ionian war gave him the chance to intrigue towards returning to Athens.

⁶⁸ *συνέπιπτε γὰρ καὶ τὸν ἐστιγμένον τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀπίχθαι.*

provided Herodotus with a critical, anti-Milesian view of the revolt which in essentials he accepted, but only with difficulty fitted in to his major theme, the struggle of the Greeks against Persia.

Further influence of Herodotus' Samian informants is to be found in his account of the Mykale campaign. In it the Samians are credited with playing the major part in the liberation of the Ionian cities, although their ships had fought well for the Persians at the battle of Salamis. After the Salamis victory the Greek fleet remained inactive till the spring of 479, when the 110 ships at Aigina under the command of the Spartan king Leotychidas moved to Delos (Hdt. viii 133.1 and ix 90). Unknown to the Persians, three Samians who are all named by Herodotus, led by Hegesistratos, enemies of the newly installed Theomestor, came and begged Leotychidas to liberate Ionia. Leotychidas was convinced, and took the name Hegesistratos for a good omen. But it is unlikely that the decision to cross the Aegean was solely the result of this embassy and the effect of a name on the Spartan commander. The Samian envoys were a group of Samian aristocrats and Herodotus' knowledge of their names and patronymics suggests that the account comes from a Samian source. A similar embassy of six Chians, who had plotted to kill their pro-Persian tyrant Strattis, had gone as refugees to Sparta shortly before and had been sent on to Leotychidas at Aigina, where they begged him to bring the Greek fleet over to liberate Ionia. But the Greeks, says Herodotus, were with difficulty persuaded to move as far as Delos, and 'as for Samos, it seemed as far off as the pillars of Heracles' (viii 132.3). This odd remark probably comes from a Samian source which contrasted the success of the Samian envoys to Leotychidas in 479 with the failure of the preceding Chian embassy.⁶⁹ Both accounts are Ionian but have a Samian slant.

In reality, the proposal to sail to Ionia had been proposed immediately after the battle of Salamis, when the Greek fleet pursued the Persians as far as Andros. Here Themistocles, having failed to persuade the rest of the Greek commanders to sail quickly to the Hellespont and cut off Xerxes' retreat, restrained the Athenians from going alone and gave the sensible advice (later interpreted by his enemies as medism) that the Greeks should wait till the spring and then sail to the Hellespont and Ionia (Hdt. viii 108-9). The Samian embassy prompted the direct move to Ionia, but it was not unforeseen. Even the victory at Mykale did not decide the question, and after the battle the Greeks again held a council to discuss the liberation of Ionia before they moved to the Hellespont (Hdt. ix 106. 2-4). Here, the Peloponnesians decided to return home, leaving the Athenians to besiege Sestos. Athens was naturally more interested in the outcome of the siege, because of her economic interests in the Hellespont and Black Sea area. The differing interests of Sparta and Athens were to be revealed even more clearly in 478, when the Spartans ceded the sea-hegemony to Athens and the Delian League was formed to carry on with the war of liberation and to compensate for Greek losses by ravaging the King's lands (Thuc. i 94-6). The whole question of the liberation of Ionia was thus too complex to have been decided by the Samian appeal alone. Sparta and Athens had different attitudes to the issue, Sparta being less closely concerned than Athens. A Samian source would be likely to exaggerate the effect of the Samian embassy on the decision of Leotychidas. The latter cannot be discounted altogether, since the Samian aristocrats had had strong links with Sparta earlier, but the decision probably depended largely on the military situation as a whole and on the fact that the Athenians, who furnished the major part of the fleet, were eager to pursue the enemy across the Aegean.

An obvious influence of the Samian source is seen in the part the Samians themselves are said to have played in the actual battle of Mykale. Disarmed and left in camp by the Persians, who suspected them of disloyalty because they had ransomed some Athenian

⁶⁹ Jacoby, *RE* II Suppl. col. 220, 462 and 466. Macan *ad loc.* suggests that 'it represents the impatience of Herodotus' Ionian source with the cautious

policy of the Spartan nauarch'. Rawlinson (*ad loc.*) puts it down unconvincingly to Herodotus' 'rhetorical exaggeration'.

prisoners, the Samians 'did all in their power to help the Greeks. And the rest of the Ionians, seeing their example, revolted and attacked the Persians' (ix 103.2). It is difficult to see how the Samians could have set an example which was observed by the other Ionians if they were disarmed and inactive in camp. Herodotus mentions the behaviour of the Milesians in the following chapter (ix 104): Stationed to act as guides in case the Persians needed to escape through the mountain passes to the safety of the heights, they deliberately misled the fleeing Persians so that they fell in with the Greeks. If this account is true the Milesians, though not decisive in the action, played a far more active role than the Samians. Yet, we are told, it was the Samians who inspired the rest of the Ionians to revolt from the Persians, an obvious exaggeration.

The Mykale narrative is oddly disconnected from the earlier part of book ix and is not told from an Athenian or Spartan angle but rather from the point of view of the Ionian participants. It is linked to the preceding account of the battle of Plataia only by the dubious tradition that both battles were fought on the same day and the unlikely story of the miraculous way in which the news of Plataia reached the fleet (ix 100–101). The Spartans and Athenians, the major participants at Plataia and in the battles of 480, both fought at Mykale. But, instead of emphasising the co-operation between them, Herodotus underlines the fact that the Athenians, together with the Corinthians, Sikyonians and Troizenians, fought hard to decide the battle before the Spartans could reach their position and engage with the enemy, thus depriving them of the credit they might have won (ix 102). The Athenians distinguished themselves most, followed by the Corinthians, Troizenians and Sikyonians (ix 105). The Spartans were hardly to blame, since their part in the battle involved a difficult march through a ravine and hills above the beach. No doubt Herodotus gives a brief account (ix 102–103.1) of the outlines of the battle as it happened, but in 103.2–104, he over-emphasises the part played by the Samians and the Milesians, since the Samians did nothing and the Milesians merely stopped some of the Persians from escaping.

Taken as a whole, Herodotus' Samian material suggests that he was not only sympathetic towards Samos but that in particular he reflects the view of the aristocratic group which came to power after Mykale and was opposed both to tyranny and medism. The Samian aristocrats with their anti-Persian traditions served the interests of Athens well in the period 478–450. It was during this period that Herodotus visited Samos as a young man, an exile from his own city, and was well treated by his Samian friends. The traditions of the Samian aristocratic families were handed to Herodotus in the same way as those of Alkmaionids and Philaids, who were his friends in Athens, and, like them, became part of the complex design of his history. I have attempted to trace the influence of the Samian sources and to suggest that it was stronger than might be supposed in affecting Herodotus' treatment of several important episodes and characters.

B. M. MITCHELL

*St Anne's College
Oxford*